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Young, innovative UK SMEs are developing successful financing strategies, using a mix of 
bootstrapping, collaboration and new emerging post-Global Financial Crisis finance escalator 
funding, which is heavily reliant on government interventions, but finance gaps still persist 
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In the aftermath of the 2007-08 global financial crisis (GFC) many governments focused their 
policies on financing innovation as a key driver for economic recovery (Hall and Lerner, 
2010; OECD, 2012; Wilson and Silver, 2013; Mazzucato and Penna, 2014; Lee et al., 2015). 
Numerous studies examined the supply-side finance policy offer, with relatively few 
considering the demand-side (Eurostat, 2011; Mina et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2015) and 
adopting a qualitative approach (North et al., 2013) required to understand business financing 
demand-side processes, decisions and deficiencies which many have requested (Mason and 
Kwok, 2010; ERC, 2013; Lee et al., 2015).    
 
This paper addresses the persistent problem of finance gaps for early and growth stage 
innovative businesses through a qualitative demand-side study of 40 UK businesses, 
exploring their ‘pathways’ to external finance and including: first, their external financing 
requirements between 2011-14; second, their processes of accessing external finance to find 
out why they succeed or fail; and third, where they fail, how they overcome this. The study 
focuses on technology-based businesses with high growth market potential and differentiates 
between shorter and longer horizon innovation cycles, which may impact on access (North et 
al., 2013). Furthermore, a unique pathways methodology is developed to explore supply-side 
and demand-side factors by bringing together theoretical elements of the business financing 
cycle (Berger and Udell, 1998) using a finance escalator model and a managerial resource-
based view (RBV) relating to human and social capital (Barney, 1991). The paper aims to 
explain demand-side failure, pinpoint supply-side funding gaps and provide policy guidance.   
 
The policy rationale for assisting innovative earlier stage businesses is supported by two key 
arguments. First, an established correlation with economic growth, associated with large-scale 
econometric studies in developed economies (Lerner, 2010; Lerner and Tag, 2013). Recent 
international studies (Mina et al., 2013; Demirel and Mazzucato, 2013 and 2010; Coad and 
Rao, 2010) suggest that their economic contribution is nuanced, favouring R&D with formal 
IP protection and skewed by a few ‘superstar’ high growth firms. Since Birch (1979) 
highlighted SMEs as job generators, governments have been preoccupied with finding and 
supporting the high growth SMEs which generate the majority of new jobs (OECD, 2002). 
UK policy has been spurred by evidence for a ‘vital 6%’ of SMEs that generate over half of 
new UK employment (Nesta, 2009a; ERC, 20141), allied to the potential role that young 
innovative SMEs could play in this (North et al., 2013). Second, since the discovery of the 
Macmillan (1931) financing gap, it is recognised that young innovative businesses encounter 
information asymmetries in the markets for finance (Hsu, 2004; Hughes, 2009) due to 
insufficient trading records and intangible knowledge-based assets. This can make them too 
risky for debt finance and prohibitively expensive for equity investors to undertake sufficient 
due diligence for the relatively small amounts of finance they require, providing a rationale 
for government intervention (Murray, 2007; Lerner, 2010).  
 
The need for governments to address the persistent gap in early stage innovation financing 
was heightened during the post-GFC environment. Business finance became more expensive 
and difficult to obtain in many countries due to bank credit rationing and the retreat to more 
secure later stage equity investing (Wilson and Silva, 2013; Eurostat, 2011), leading to widely 
held observations that difficulties in raising external finance for young innovative SMEs was 
particularly exacerbated and to a proliferation of government interventions. In the UK, many 
considered the finance escalator (Nesta, 2009) for these businesses was broken (Mason et al., 
2010; Gill, 2010; North et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2015). This paralleled UK Coalition 




greater focus on advanced manufacturing and high value export services where young 
innovative SMEs were perceived as an important driver to post-GFC growth.  
 
The paper comprises three main sections. First, a theoretical discussion in relation to 
innovation, finance and the business development cycle, how this relates to the evolving post-
GFC UK finance escalator model and the crucial role that management experience and the 
business resource base including external support and networking can play. Second, the 
research methodology and key findings are set out. Finally, the implications of the findings 




SME innovation can broadly be defined as the commercial exploitation of ideas (DTI, 1998), 
which various studies have quantified in terms of the scale and distribution of new or 
improved products, services and a range of business processes including improvements in 
organisation, structure, marketing, and activities such as R&D, training, and acquisition of 
machinery and equipment linked to innovation (e.g. BIS, 2013; 2014). However, as North et 
al., (2001) suggest, the degree of innovation in terms of its potential market impact is crucial 
to this paper. 
 
This suggests three key innovation drivers of economic growth that underpin this paper. First, 
significant technological advances in sectors associated with R&D expenditure, ‘high 
technology’, and patent and trademark registrations (Pavitt et al., 1987; Thwaites and 
Wynarczyk, 1996; Bullock and Milner, 2003). Second, innovation ranges from ‘internally-
significant’ where innovations are new only to the firm itself, to ‘externally-significant’ 
innovations which profoundly impact on global markets, economies, and societies (OECD, 
2005). Third, the degree of innovation intensity relating to cost and duration of the R&D 
innovation cycle which progresses through initial concept, proof of concept, prototyping, 
market testing, to establishing a market presence. These factors will have varying impacts on 
the attraction of external finance, explored in the supply-side discussion.     
 
Demand-side factors: Financing pathways, a Resource-Based View 
 
Fundamental to this paper, we examine external financing requirements and explain 
theoretically why young innovative businesses may succeed or fail to access the external 
finance that they require. Where they fail, we examine factors that contribute and discuss 
whether such failure can be explained through demand-side factors. 
 
Pecking order hypothesis (PoH) (Myers and Majluf, 1984) is a common explanation for 
businesses selection (priority tendencies) for using different types of finance, favouring 
internal finance over debt finance, with equity finance and loss of ownership share being least 
favoured, notably by family owned businesses (Hiebl, 2013; KPMG, 2014). PoH may be 
influenced by business resource-based factors such as managerial experience, knowledge and 
the role of external advice and information (Hirsch and Waltz, 2011). Berger and Udell 
(1998) subsequently provided a balancing supply-side hypothesis by incorporating 
asymmetric supply-side theory into a business finance life-cycle model, suggesting that as 
businesses become more established and less opaque to financiers, a wider range of financing 
options become available. Their theory underpins the finance escalator, providing a dynamic 
external financing supply map for each stage of the business development cycle. First, 
demand-side factors are assessed. 
 
From a demand-side perspective, the SME external financing pathway for innovation can be 
viewed as stage specific, within the course of the business cycle (Churchill and Lewis, 1983) 
and resource-based in assessing external finance requirements and seeking access. External 
finance is defined as outside the existing investor base (typically founders, family and friends) 
and retained surplus for reinvestment. This requires a fusion of the pathway steps taken to 
consider financing requirements and the resource-based view (RBV) which seeks to explain 
why actions are taken. Koryak et al.’ (2015) review entrepreneurial leadership and SME 
growth suggesting that the elements of growth capabilities involving management leadership, 
team diversity of human capital, organisational skills, strategic networking and venturing and 
dynamic absorptive capabilities are key factors in growth, but that more needs to be known 
about how they operate, particularly in relation to accessing finance. 
 
Recent UK government studies (BIS 2010, 2012, 2014) adopt a linear pathway approach 
(Figure 1) tracing the steps taken from an initial trigger requirement for external finance (such 
as, R&D, recruitment, working capital, capital equipment), through assessing the amount and 
type of finance required, search procedures for appropriate providers, applying for finance, 
and outcomes which may result in full, partial or non-funding. The latter options may lead to 
further assessment of financing requirements which may result in project closure, scaling 
down or a further funding search.       
 
(insert F1) 
The RBV of innovative SME growth sees entrepreneurial preferences driven by their 
resources, including finance, hence assuming that the entrepreneur will seek external finance 
when project requirements necessitate fund raising (Barney, 1991). Heffernan’s (2007) 
modified RBV growth model applies to the innovative SME’s growth journey, but a life cycle 
approach also requires the assessment of the business’s dynamic capabilities. This involves a 
set of skills, knowledge, processes, procedures, organisational structures, decision rules and 
disciplines. It suggests that a greater degree of formalisation and planning can lead to 
improved success (Wang et al., 2007), but within earlier stage SMEs this needs to be flexible 
and dynamic. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) argue that dynamic capabilities are a set of 
identifiable and specific processes such as product development, strategic decision-making 
and alliancing which can be path-dependent. Teece (2007) links dynamic capabilities to 
entrepreneurial behaviour, giving rise to potential path dependency based on previous 
experience of external financing and the influences of those financiers (Hirsch and Waltz, 
2011; Baldock, 2015).  
Absorptive capacity is arguably a concept that captures dynamic capabilities over time, the key 
difference being an ability to exploit as well as acquire and act on information (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and George, 2002). Put simply, absorptive capacity is a firm’s ability to 
acquire, process, and exploit information. Situations of uncertainty, such as the post-GFC 
environment, place a premium on a firm’s ability to process information and adapt (e.g. 
financing models) or pivot (e.g. innovations) accordingly.  
 
From a resource perspective, theoretically, small innovative firms may face finance gaps that 
arise out of information asymmetries. Innovative firms’ resources are often intangible assets 
(such as intellectual property rights – ‘IPR’), but these present evaluation and risk issues for 
potential funders. For example, credit providers will discount intangible assets and equity 
providers must judge the risk of such investments when information on market value is limited. 
However, such information gaps may be mitigated by higher quality of human and social 
capital.  
 
This highlights the role of human and social capital in access to finance. The availability and 
cost of external finance is likely to vary with the degree to which businesses’ commercial 
transactions with financiers (whether bank debt, private equity or joint venturing) are embedded 
in social attachments. Embedded ties, established over time, provide private information 
benefits that can channel resources and motivate parties to find financing solutions that are not 
available through simple market transactions (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997). It explains how 
integral social relations and networking can positively affect the allocation and valuation of 
financing resources, using exchange protocols associated with social, non-commercial 
attachments to govern business dealings (Uzzi, 1999). Thus, relationship banking (where a 
close relationship is developed) for example, may mitigate some of the information 
asymmetries. Alternatively, supply-side interventions, discussed below, may provide incentives 
that encourage more risk taking, allowing more ‘distant’ financing relationship. 
 
These underpinning RBV and social embeddedness approaches to the innovative firm suggest 
that factors such as access to information and networks, skill sets of management and staff, 
ability to process information and to learn from experience all contribute to determining when 
an innovative firm will be aware of, and seek, different forms of external finance and their 
ultimate chances of application success. Deficiencies which are not remedied by external 
assistance are likely to result in demand-side failures (Mason and Harrison, 2004; Murray, 
2007) and the need for effective remedial assistance through investment readiness programmes 
(IRP) and ongoing support that can maximise the most effective use of funding (Mason and 
Kwok, 2010; Baldock, 1998). 
 
 
The supply-side and the evolving post GFC UK finance escalator     
 
The supply-side finance escalator provides a key explanatory mechanism for the supply of 
external finance for young innovative businesses. It can pinpoint where financing gaps exist 
and whether there is supply-side failure. SMEs external financing choices are constrained by 
the availability of different types of finance during early and growth stage development. The 
finance escalator (Nesta, 2009) utilizes Berger and Udells’ (1998) business finance life-cycle 
model to map the different types of finance available to businesses during life-cycle stages.  
 
Early stage financing spans activities from pre-start concept proofing to start-up R&D and 
prototyping through to early market piloting. The growth stage typically refers to the 
transition between early market activity and achieving an established market position, 
typically completed via trade sale, initial public offering (IPO) or management buyout (MBO) 
when investors receive their return (Deakins and Freel, 2012). The length of time taken to 
achieve this will be determined by the length and intensity of the innovation, availability of 
required external financing and market acceptance (Baldock and North, 2015).  
 
From a risk perspective, supply-side providers face different degrees of risk that vary with the 
sector, stage and growth of innovative small firms. For example, with start-up innovative 
small firms there is greater market uncertainty that with later stage. As highlighted below, 
variable sectors give different innovative life cycles with different levels of risk. Some risks 
can be transferred through insurance (or protected by security), but as discussed above the 
risks associated with intangible assets (such as imitation) are difficult to evaluate. RBV 
suggest that small innovative firms have advantages when valuable resources are protected 
(that is through patents) and cannot be easily imitated. 
 
Therefore, long horizon intensive R&D sectors, such as life/bio-science, advanced 
engineering and cleantech, with 10 to 15 year innovation cycles experience persistent patient 
capital financing gaps (SQW, 2009). Hall and Lerner (2010) suggest this is due to heightened 
information asymmetries relating to the raised levels of investor uncertainty, supporting 
Gompers (1995) finding that VC investment in high tech is smaller in higher risk earlier 
rounds, indicating that interventions such as tax breaks can help mitigate through encouraging 
private investment. Rowlands (2009) estimated a UK early growth stage patient finance gap 
of £2m to £10m. North et al., (2013) and Baldock (2015) contrast this with shorter horizon 
software and digitech sector innovations taking three years or less to complete, suggesting 
quicker potential returns are more attractive to investors and also more suited to current UK 
tax relief through the start-up Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme (SEIS) and early stage 
Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS)2.  
   
Various studies (North et al., 2013; Mason et al., 2010, Gill, 2010) have used the finance 
escalator to highlight potential supply-side finance gaps, whilst others such as Harrison 
(2014) and Baldock and Mason (2015) have used it to track the changes in availability of 
finance, post GFC, in the UK.  Recently highlights of the evolving UK finance escalator 
include: (i) the withdrawal of early stage bank debt finance (North et al., 2013; Cowling et al., 
2012); (ii) the withdrawal of private VC from early stage and even early growth stage finance 
(Baldock and Mason, 2015; Mason et al., 2010); (iii) the increasing role of public VC funding 
in early and early growth stage financing (Mason and Pierrakis, 2013; North et al., 2013); (iv) 
the increasing role of grant funding in early stage finance, extending beyond initial proof of 
concept funding (Baldock and Mason, 2015; North et al., 2013); (v) the emerging role of new 
and alternative forms of equity finance in early stage funding, such as through corporate 
sponsored accelerators and seed equity crowdfunding platforms (GLA, 2013; Collins et al., 









models including self-funding, consultancy income, and collaborative (e.g. licensing, joint 
venturing) arrangements (Mac an Bhaird and Lynn, 2015).   
 
 
Government policy, post-GFC  
 
The post-GFC environment witnessed widespread national government responses designed to 
stimulate innovation and economic recovery. The OECD (2009) featured six main types of 
policy response: (i) public research institutions and education programmes (e.g. Australia, 
US); (ii) loan guarantees, including the UK Enterprise Finance Guarantee; (iii) tax breaks, 
including R&D spend (UK, Netherlands); (iv) sector specialisation (e.g. health and the 
environment in the US and Netherlands); (v) recruitment support for key staff (Canada, 
Germany); (vi) structural measures such as public private collaborations to encourage private 
funding (France).  
 
It is widely acknowledged that innovation policy requires a broad and holistic approach 
(Murray et al., 2009; Hughes, 2009; Hwang and Horowitt, 2012; Mason and Brown, 2013) to 
establish an effective financing and support ecosystem. In the UK, the Coalition Government 
2010-15, ring-fenced R&D funding at £4.6bn per annum3 (BIS, 2012a) including education, 
training, key sector (e.g. low carbon to meet climate change targets) and financing 
instruments.  
 
This paper focuses on early and growth stage SME innovation financing instruments and 
investment readiness programmes (IRP) to bridge private finance gaps. Table 1 presents the 
key sources of UK government and EU public finance available to innovative UK SMEs in 
                                                            
3 This figure was frozen, but calculated by the OECD (2012) to represent a likely real terms loss of 10%  
the period 2010-15 covering this study. Baldock and Mason (2015), Baldock and North 
(2015) and North et al., (2013) provide detailed accounts of these grant, equity, loan and tax 
incentive schemes. A major issue they examine is the level of public funding additionality in 
providing and catalysing funding that would not otherwise have been available, as opposed to 
displacement and duplication of existing private funding (Leleux and Surlemont, 2003) and 
incidence of deadweight relating to agency failures in funding unsuitable businesses (Hall and 
Lerner, 2010; Lerner 2002). 
 
The British Business Bank was established in 2013 to co-ordinate SME finance (Van der 
Schans, 2015), monitor finance gaps and developing financing instruments to create an 
effectively flowing UK finance escalator that encourages private investment and support 
service development (Lerner, 2010). However, a considerable array of relevant government 
finance is not within its remit. This questions whether this agency can  achieve the effective 
cohesive role that Mazzucato and Penna (2014) and Breedon (2012) suggest that state 
investment banks, such as the German Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) play and it may 







Developing an enhanced theoretical framework and research propositions 
 
Drawing on the theories presented, Table 2 presents a unique generalised contemporary UK-
wide finance escalator stages framework which is combined with a managerial RBV 
including external advice and information to provide explanatory factors for the various 
pathways to finance taken by innovative businesses and their relative success in obtaining the 
external finance that they require. Focusing on the early and growth stages outlined, the paper 
examines four research propositions: 
 
P1: Early and growth stage funding pathways will be differentiated, with greater 
success at later stages. The finance escalator suggests fewer options at earlier stages, 
with PoH indicating entrepreneurial financing preferences which may also restrict options, 
whilst the RBV suggests greater development of external finance ties, for example 
through the development of social capital, would lead to the expectation of greater speed 
and success in accessing finance. 
 
P2: Pathways to external finance will be differentiated by innovation intensity, with 
greater success for shorter horizon innovation.  The expectation is that longer (five 
plus years), more intensive, R&D innovation will require larger scale, more patient 
capital, suggesting a more complicated pathway. 
 
P3: Pathways will be differentiated by prior management experience and external 
advice, with greater success for those with greater experience and more advanced 
networks. The RBV perspective suggests that previous management experience, 
networking connections, the existence of close relationships and the use of appropriate 
advice, would lead to quicker and more successful outcomes. 
 
P4: Pathways will be affected by external finance gaps, with those experiencing 
finance gaps more likely to develop alternative financing approaches. Here the 
expectation is that, controlling for demand-side deficiencies, earlier stage and more 
intensive long horizon innovation will reveal finance gaps, examples of alternative 
financing approaches and strong policy indicators, particularly for UK finance escalator 




Developing on the existing research base, a semi-structured management survey of 40 early 
and growth stage independent UK innovative businesses was undertaken. This enabled 
qualitative in-depth process insights, whilst also being sufficiently large-scale to provide 
useful quantitative data analysis. Businesses were purposively selected from a range of 
sources, including: previous interviews with technology based small firms (TBSFs), which 
could provide more precise selection and longitudinal data (10 cases); Dun and Bradstreet 
data on 3,3004 UK TBSF sector start-ups since 2005; and company data from UK science 
parks and accelerators. 
 
In order to select the most appropriate businesses, the following selection criteria were used:   
(i) An innovation involving new or improved product, service or process activity had 
taken place in the last three years and was perceived by the surveyed manager to 
have national or international market impact. 
(ii) External finance had been required in the previous three years 2011-14 to enable 
the innovative activity to progress. 
(iii) Businesses were established at the time of the survey and had at least progressed 
from proof of concept to start-up stage and could be defined as either early stage 
with less than two years of trading record, or growth stage, either with at least two 
years trading record or with substantial market development external financing 
requirements.  
(iv) Businesses trading for more than five years, or with over 249 employees, at the 





(v) To account for potential differences between long and short horizon innovation, a 
broad range of sectors including typically longer R&D life science, cleantech and 
advanced engineering and shorter horizon software digitechs were included. 
(vi) To avoid regional data skew to the London-Oxbridge triangle where UK 
innovation and finance is concentrated (Baldock and Mason, 2015) widespread 
regional UK coverage was required. 
 
The management interview survey took place in February 2015 with the chief executive or 
finance officer (CEO, CFO), either face-to-face on site (20) or via extended telephone 
interview (20). Interviews took an average of one hour and were recorded, transcribed and 
validated by respondents for accuracy. Data collected were also cross-checked against public 
records, including company websites, investor reports, annual company reports and Company 
House data.  
 
The semi-structured survey instrument was piloted on three cases, including early and growth 
stage businesses and consisted of five sections: (i) business profiling, including; broad sector, 
UK region, age (establishment and trading), employment and sales turnover change and future 
forecast (for past and future three years) and management team (experience and structure); (ii) 
type of innovation (product, service, process) and length and intensity of the R&D cycle; (iii) 
the pathway process (Figure 1) to assess external financing need, select type of finance 
required and find suitable finance, including use of external advice and information; (iv) the 
application process for external finance, including success measures and, where applicable, 
further steps taken if partially or completely unsuccessful with initial applications; (v) an 
overall assessment of the UK early and growth stage finance experience, business impacts 
relating to financing model and performance and suggestions for improvements.   
 
Cleaned, checked, transcribed data were entered into an Excel spreadsheet, enabling linear 
case-by-case process analysis and enabling content analysis (such as using word and phrase 
searches) to inductively build clusters of response types and segment them by key stage, 
innovation and management resource variables. This enabled proposition testing (Eisenhardt, 
1989) and establishment of causal inference (Yin, 2003), the main unit of analysis being the 
business.            
 
Addressing adverse selection 
 
Major criticisms of small-scale qualitative research concern adverse selection and the 
generalisation of findings. Whilst careful sampling largely addresses this (Ritchie et al., 
2003), possibility remains that despite the selected sample containing robust surviving 
businesses, they may not be suitable for risk finance (whether funded or not). To assess this, 
the surveyed businesses were stress tested using a scorecard (un-weighted) of key 
determinants of earlier stage investment based on five key elements drawn from the literature: 
 
1. Management track record and funding experience (Reid and Smith, 2001) allied to 
external networking connections and assistance (Denis, 2004; Lahti, 2014). 
2. Market traction of the business in terms of sales track record or orders (Amit et al., 
1990; Sapienza and Amason, 1993). 
3. Innovation scale in terms of degree of innovation, market scale and pivot-ability (Ries, 
2011; Basulto, 2015). 
4. Amount of external funding required in the round (North et al., 2013). 
5. Length of innovation horizon (Baldock and Mason, 2015; Baldock and North, 2015).       
 
Each element presented a 10 point scale (elements 4 and 5 being inverse scores for the cost 
and length of innovation within each stage), providing in-group summary comparison total 
scores out of 50 (‘T-scores’) indicating, in the absence of a suitable comparator or control 
sample, surveyed businesses relative suitability for obtaining funding. The model (Table 3) 
has suitably robust explanatory powers. It demonstrates that lower quartile scores were 
significantly (<.1 level) associated with lower proportional success at receiving some or all 
funding and that upper quartile scores were significantly associated (<.1 level) with 
proportionally higher success at receiving all required funding without undue delays. 
Furthermore, it demonstrates that growth stage businesses (which had a higher mean T-score 
of +3.4) were significantly more successful than their early stage counterparts at obtaining 
external finance. Overall, these findings suggest there are businesses in the lower ‘T-score’ 
quartile, particularly in the early stage category, which are higher risk and potentially 
unsuitable for funding. Conversely, there are also two unfunded businesses (one early and one 
growth stage) in the upper quartile which may suggest that there is a funding gap. These 




Profile of surveyed innovative SMEs 
 
Table 4 presents a profile of the 40 surveyed businesses by early and growth stage 
development, providing context for the stage analysis presented later. This demonstrates that 
all are currently innovating with half of the growth stage businesses involved in multiple 
innovations (three or more), often relating to variants of their main innovative technology 
platform. Focusing on the main innovation taking place, the vast majority relate to new or 
improved products and services, with process innovation more likely to relate to growth stage 
businesses that are seeking capital investment for acquiring and establishing their own R&D 
laboratory testing and manufacturing activities and in one case to build a demonstration 
biomass energy plant. The majority of surveyed managers assessed their main innovation to 
be significant to international markets. The nine early stage businesses assessing only UK 
market significance exhibited caution, suggesting that their software or engineering solutions 
were niche to particular UK sectors, but in several cases indicated potential wider 
international application. The more established growth stage businesses all aimed for global 




To facilitating examination of the Rowlands’ gap hypothesis (2009), longer and shorter 
horizon innovation is distinguished. As expected, Table 2 demonstrates that the selected 
technology-based businesses fall into two distinctive groups. First, 17 shorter horizon digital 
technology businesses including search engine operations (SEO), applications and cloud 
solutions, and also digital solutions for life sciences (meditech), financial services (fintech) 
and in engineering and cleantech. These software-based activities took between one to four 
years to develop to market, typically taking two years. Thus, an important distinction with 
software development is that it can quickly reach markets. Once established there is an 
ongoing process of continuing refinements within the market (through updates and upgrades). 
A notable finding here is that two growth stage life science and cleantech businesses operate 
short horizon intermediary innovation services, collaborating with universities and R&D 
specialists to harness later stage technology, progressing to market or licensing within a two 
to three year period.   
 
Second, 23 longer horizon innovation businesses, including: life science, aerospace, 
instrument engineering and advanced manufacturing, and cleantechs undertaking equipment 
and plant development. These innovations, involving extensive piloting, testing, trialling and 
regulatory approvals, could take 5-16 years and perhaps longer (given findings from early 
stage investors of lengthening investment horizons in the aftermath of the GFC downturn in 
the UK economy, Baldock, 2017). Typical median timescales are therefore likely to be best 
case scenarios and unduly optimistic for early stage businesses when compared with the 
responses of the more experienced growth stage managers.  
 
As indicated in our theoretical discussion, assessing growth performance for earlier stage 
innovative businesses in conventional employment and sales turnover terms is notoriously 
problematic (Baldock and Mason, 2015), not least because of the uncertainty associated with 
the unpredictability of external funding and timescales to reaching and developing markets. 
Here some basic measures of growth during the last three years are provided to demonstrate 
how some of these businesses are making a difference and contributing to Nesta’s (2009) 
‘Vital 6%’ of employment and growth drivers in the UK economy. The early stage businesses 
are essentially micro businesses (1-9 employees) with a current median of 3.5 employees, 
only three employing 10 or more people. The median size of growth stage businesses is 13 
employees. However, these include five medium-sized businesses (50-249 employees) and 
one advanced plastics manufacturer that, since receiving innovation funding, has grown 
beyond the SME range. Overall, these businesses have created 600 new jobs in the past three 
years, with median increase of +2.5 jobs in the early stage and +11 jobs in the growth stage. 
The average increase of +61 jobs at the growth stage is skewed by a significant minority of 
five stellar businesses (including cleantech, life science and advanced manufacturing) 
generating between 25-165 new jobs in this period.   
 
Assessment of sales turnover growth is restricted for early stage businesses, with only half 
trading at the time of the survey. However, from those that have started trading during the last 
three years, valid data (n=11) indicated median sales growth of £140,000 in this period, whilst 
for the growth stage businesses the median sales growth has been £585,000 (n=14). Two of 
the growth stage businesses are life science, long horizon innovators that have not yet reached 
the market. They are included in this stage because of the major step change investments that 
they have made, including an IPO and substantial private and corporate pharma equity 
investments (representing £200m and £16m respectively), leading to job growth and 
significant likelihood of future global growth.  
 
Overall, it may be seen that some of these businesses are highly successful and making a 
positive difference to the UK economy. The next section examines the role of external finance 




        
The research findings presented explore the four main propositions concerning the pathways 
to external finance that innovative businesses take. They are presented in segmentation to 
facilitate answering the propositions and to draw out the considerably different approaches to, 
and experiences with, external financing between the early and growth stages studied. 
 
P1: Early Stage versus Growth Stage 
 
Early stage businesses were quite evenly divided between the initially self-funded (‘3Fs’), 
those established with R&D contract income whilst also seeking to undertake their own 
innovations, and those that had sought external finance from the outset. These contrasted 
individuals and small founder first time entrepreneur teams with no previous experience of 
seeking external finance with more experienced spin-out managers and serial entrepreneurs 
who “knew from the outset that the company would be a vehicle for fundraising,” or set out 
with a contract R&D approach knowing that “early stage financing is difficult and time 
consuming to obtain.”     
 
Early stage businesses, particularly those without entrepreneurial fundraising experience, 
lacked formal discipline in their business and financial planning practices, making “kitchen 
table decisions,” presenting a picture of muddling through, iterative learning-by-doing 
practices. This resulted in wasted time seeking unsuitable types of finance, including bank 
debt finance, alternative crowd source debt finance (e.g. Funding Circle5) and private VC. 
These required “proven trading records” of at least two years in the case of debt finance and 
“evidence of genuine market traction” in the case of VC. Entrepreneurial preferences were in-
line with the PoH (Myers and Majluf, 1984), notably including two family-owned businesses 
averse to equity finance (Hiebl, 2013): “We are family run and don’t want others interfering 
in managing our business”. However, the vast majority of surveyed managers (early and 




of finance available for risky pre-revenue businesses.” They suggested that the current UK 
supply of early stage finance largely consists of grant funding from Innovate UK6, LEP 
catalysts7, and Scottish Enterprise alongside funding from high net worth individuals 
(HNWIs), business angel syndicates, public and private seed VCs and accelerators, whilst a 
couple mentioned crowd sourced equity as a possible option, although none had applied 
(Table 4). Funding was mainly required for R&D, but also related to working capital, key 
staff recruitment, proof of concept (PoC), prototyping and marketing, depending on the status 
of early stage innovation progression towards early marketing. The funding required could be 
considerable, ranging from £25,000-£50,000 for initial start-up working capital and PoC work 
to £2-3m for intensive engineering and life science R&D. These findings support evidence of 
a changing post-GFC early stage UK funding escalator (Baldock and Mason, 2015) with 




A number of outcomes emanated from initial failure to secure external finance, with under 
half receiving all of the funding they required and a similar proportion only receiving part 
(Table 5). Partial success resulted mainly from grant offers requiring match funding8 and 
difficulties raising sufficient equity finance, with bank finance typically not available. 
Resulting outcomes included increased incidence of seeking external advice and assistance, 
which was already widely used by more experienced early stage managers, increased 
consideration of equity finance, increased incidence of opportunistic funding applications for 







alternative financing strategies involving greater emphasis on R&D consultancy and seeking 
licensing solutions in order to share the costs of R&D. These are surviving businesses, 
characterised by their tenacity. It typically took three months to make an initial application, 
but for those that were partially or completely unsuccessful, this resulted in slowing down or 
temporary cessation of innovation, scaling down of operations and in the majority of cases a 
continuing search for funding, which typically took another two years. This finding supports 
North et al., (2013) in their assertion that early stage UK innovation financing is typically 
very time consuming and costly in terms of management time and opportunity costs in lost 
contractor revenue. However, for these businesses the indication is that persistence can 
eventually be successful. Early stage businesses that are dynamic, willing to be flexible in 
strategies and capable of absorbing and adapting to secure resources are likely to be 
successful in securing suitable external finance (Zahra and George, 2002).  
    
Growth stage businesses were far more formalised in their assessment of funding 
requirements, particularly where they already had angel and VC investors who required 
regular financial and business planning reporting. They were also far more willing and 
quicker to assess the need to engage and pay for external advisors, such as VC/PE finder 
services and IPO brokers. This formalised procedure was exemplified by an experienced life 
science CEO: 
 
“When I took over as CEO we had a prototype device … I took the decision that we needed to 
take that to market in order to validate the technology.  I put together a strategic project plan 
to do clinical studies and worked with my finance officer and the management team to fully 
cost all the elements, salaries, overheads, equipment, clinical studies running costs, and the 
cost of the external regulatory advice. So, for instance, to do the clinical study we needed a 
clinical research organisation for about six months of their input, so we went out and 
obtained quotes from a number of external companies and agencies to recruit for one-off 
tasks. I then took that strategic plan to the board. The process took about six months, relating 
to a requirement to raise £5 million to take the product to market.” 
 
Growth stage businesses typically required considerably more funding than their early stage 
counterparts, ranging up to £12m for an advanced plastics manufacturer to undertake an MBO 
acquisition of a manufacturing plant. Their median funding requirement was £1m, although 
for several longer horizon R&D companies this represented an intermediate round for 
ongoing R&D and could be considerably higher for later stage testing and prototyping; for 
example, a substantive £2.2m capital investment to build a demonstration biomass energy 
plant. Market development is also an increasingly important form of investment, requiring 
sales staff recruitment and funding overseas offices. A rapid growth digitech CEO of a 
specialist SEO platform with a recently opened US office noted that “the growth of this 
business is determined by the speed of increasing our sales team, which can then build up a 
larger customer base for us to provide ongoing services.”  The types of finance applied for 
are indicative of the larger scale risk finance requirements of these businesses, which relate 
more to VCs and business angel networks (BAN syndicates), rather than HNWIs, and also to 
private and corporate equity and IPOs for two life science businesses. In a couple of cases 
substantial bank finance was applied for, but even with the Enterprise Finance Guarantee 
(EFG)9, these relatively early trading businesses were rejected. Grant funding, mainly in the 
form of technology development grants from Innovate UK and EU Horizon10 funds, remain 
an important source of finance at this stage. These businesses have established good contacts 
with universities and research centres and mention how this collaboration is crucial to the 
success rates of applications. However, several managers mentioned that grant funding is 





“The current UK grant system is actually funding to fail by not providing successful 
applicants meeting all of their funding milestones with prompt further funding. Perfectly good 
projects run out of funding and are put on hold whilst further funding is sought. Since 
Innovate’s funding rounds only occur half yearly and may not offer a relevant funding call, 
delays in finding external funding can result in project delays or closures and loss of market 
primacy for the innovator, as competitors catch up.”       
 
Whilst the initial application success rate of growth stage businesses was better than for early 
stage, this was to some extent due to more experienced managers being able to work with 
their current investors to obtain follow-on finance, or to assist in finding new funding sources. 
However, it was also due to a wider range of funding options available to these businesses, 
including the recently improved liquidity status of the UK AIM, demonstrating its fundraising 
role for innovative businesses (Baldock, 2015), and the success of well-established grant 
writing collaborations with universities. Furthermore, there were a couple of examples of joint 
ventures, forged by maturing working relationships, in one case with a manufacturer who 
invested £100,000 into prototype equipment for an advanced ‘icepig’ pipeline cleaning 
innovation and in the other case with a large pharma that could undertake later stage drug 
trials (an investment under licence, worth several million pounds).  
 
The three businesses that failed to secure sufficient funding at the time of initial application 
are characterised by the change in funding type that they required for step-change investment. 
This included a cleantech business (‘T-score’ 19.3) requiring £2.2m to build a demonstration 
biomass plant, an advanced plastics manufacturer (‘T-score’ 28.7) requiring £12m to acquire 
a manufacturing plant and a life science R&D contractor (‘T-score’ 31), requiring £1m to 
refinance the business and develop their in-house innovative brain disease treatments. ‘T-
score’ analysis demonstrates that the former was in the lowest quartile, representing a 
particularly high risk in terms of lack of trading record and intensive R&D financing 
requirements, whilst the latter two cases are in the upper quartile, which may suggest market 
failure. Failure to raise bank loans, which were unsuitable even with EFG, and government 
backed VC which was criticised by one CEO as “acting with similar criteria to private VC 
and not investing in early growth stage businesses”, led two of these businesses to use 
external VC finders and embark on three year searches. One was successful in accessing 
government backed UK Innovation Investment Fund (UKIIF) VC alongside a mezzanine loan 
from a Czech bank, whilst the other (with the low ‘T-score’) eventually adopted a licensing 
model whereby their clients raise the £2m required, using asset-based finance to build their 
own biomass plants and then receive ongoing servicing under license. The third business 
continues to operate on a slow growth trajectory, relying on a mix of contract R&D income 
and grant funding, until such time as it can obtain more substantive bank or equity finance.     
 
In summary, it is clear (Table 5) that more established growth stage businesses are 
considerably more successful at the initial application stage and also overall, despite their far 
greater external financing requirements. To some extent this supports the finance escalator’s 
greater range and scale of finance available as businesses develop track records and become 
less opaque to financiers. However, the findings also suggest other factors influence success 
and failure, such as innovation intensity, management experience, external assistance and 
potential funding gaps relating to the availability of debt and equity finance.        
 
Longer versus Shorter Horizon Innovation 
 
Comparing the longer (5+ years) and shorter horizon (<5 years) innovation businesses, 
notable differences are revealed (Table 5) suggesting that at both early and growth stages 
longer horizon innovation businesses experience greater difficulties in accessing external 
finance and that this is particularly the case for larger growth stage finance, supporting the 
Rowlands’ gap hypothesis (2009).   
 
At the early stage, longer horizon innovation businesses typically require larger amounts of 
external funding (median £200,000, compared to £150,000 for shorter horizon businesses) 
and appear far more likely to seek VC or even early stage corporate finance. The reason for 
this is the substantial overall size of external funding required for longer horizon projects 
which are considered in many cases to be “beyond the reach of business angel syndicates.”  
For example, several life science CEOs mentioned that their overall project cost requirements 
were in excess of £10-15m, requiring multiple rounds of funding. Whilst business angel 
syndicates could fund early stage investment of up to £500,000, they were unlikely to have 
the follow-on funding capacity for later funding rounds. Early stage corporate investment, 
such as from large pharmas, was considered, but few enter the market at this early stage. 
Notably, only a small proportion (one quarter) of early stage longer horizon businesses 
received all of the funding that they required. Examination of ‘T-scores’ for those not 
receiving any funding indicated that they were typically lower (mean 21) when compared to 
the completely successful short horizon businesses (mean 27.1), but that the main 
differentiating factor was the length of investment horizon score (mean difference 4.35).  
 
This funding shortfall slowed development and led to additional interim funding round 
requirements or changing emphasis to undertaking more contract R&D for income, taking the 
business focus away from its own innovation development. In some cases, innovation process 
remodelling occurred, for example, a life science business that started licensing out their 
innovative ‘nanogenic’ treatments to small laboratories who could absorb the cost of testing 
and later stage trials.  
 
At the growth stage the difficulties for external financing of longer horizon businesses appear 
most acute. Here, the high costs of extended R&D and prototyping or clinical testing are 
exemplified by the far higher median external financing requirements of longer horizon 
businesses (£1.6m) compared to their shorter horizon counterparts (£215,000). Again, the 
focus is on equity finance, mainly from VCs, but also including business angel syndicates in 
combination with VCs, corporate and private equity, and examples of joint venture sharing of 
innovation costs and an IPO. Bank debt finance was still not an option and those that applied 
were rejected, due to the large sums required (£1m and £12m11) and the ineffectiveness of the 
EFG in these cases. Again, whilst growth stage businesses are more successful in obtaining 
external finance than their early stage counterparts, it is the longer horizon businesses that are 
less successful in obtaining all of the funding that they require and importantly they face 
considerably longer searches for their finance (a median of nine months to initial funding 
decision, compared to two months for their shorter horizon counterparts). Two long horizon 
businesses had not received any funding (one with an upper quartile ‘T-score’, which may 
suggest a finance gap). 
 
A notable anomaly is a shorter horizon life science business requiring £7m growth stage 
investment that undertook joint venturing and IPO fund raising. It specialises in fast 
turnaround intermediary services, sourcing later stage university genetics research and 
developing new treatments for large pharmas to take to the market. This short horizon 
company shared many of the attributes of digitech companies, “benefiting hugely from the 
Enterprise Investment Scheme [EIS]” which had encouraged HNWI and angel syndicate 




investment ceilings are a drop in the ocean to our external funding requirements” and that 
“these tax break schemes do not offer sufficient longer term incentives for investors.”                  
 
The greater problems accessing external finance experienced by longer innovation horizon 
early and growth stage businesses caused delays to innovation of up to three years. They also 
encouraged revised business funding approaches, leading to increased self-funding evidenced 
by bootstrapping techniques in the earlier stages (e.g. personal credit and pension cash-out 
investment) and through R&D contract work and collaborations, notably for growth stage 
licensing arrangements which enabled innovation cost sharing between businesses alongside a 
dilution in the returns from the successful market adoption of the innovation.  
 
Greater versus Lesser Management Experience and Resources 
 
Our findings suggest the potential importance of management experience in taking a strategic 
and formalised approach and, also the information and advisory resources that management 
can call upon, to assess, find and successfully apply for external financing options. This 
highlights the relevance of the RBV approach. It demonstrates clear differences between the 
surveyed early and growth stage businesses, with Table 6 presenting the emerging hierarchy 
of management experience and external resources relating to the access to finance pathway 




Early stage businesses exhibit a high proportion of first time founders with no previous 
experience of applying for the grant and equity finance that is most suitable. They are, 
therefore, very reliant on external advice, training and collaborations. It is strikingly evident 
that the quality and suitability of external advice is the key to successful external finance 
selection and application. Almost all early stage businesses used external advice and training, 
or collaborated with academic researchers or businesses to develop grant proposals, or find 
suitable equity financing sources, with many using combinations of approaches. Despite the 
extensive external assistance used, application outcomes were mixed, with half receiving only 
some or no funding (Table 5). Managers’ explanations for these results mainly related to the 
quality of external assistance received: 
 
“Accelerator advice was too generic, one size fits all, too theoretical … and the people giving 
the advice hadn’t done it themselves. It got us organised, but we failed to secure any funding 
from this and wasted a year.” Early stage engineering business founder.           
 
“Assistance that we received from Entrepreneurial Spark, a Scottish Enterprise accelerator, 
has been most influential in terms of wiring a successful grant application and developing 
network and direct links to early equity stage bodies.”  Early stage gaming software business 
founder.  
 
One might expect serial entrepreneurs to be more successful, but the evidence is mixed. Some 
founders demonstrated absorptive capacity (Zahra and George, 2002), for example, by 
learning from past failure by adopting more realistic funding strategies which in the cases of 
two life science businesses involved “slower organic growth supported by our own contract 
research revenue” and “sharing of innovation development costs through licensing out drug 
testing to other small laboratories.” There were also several cases where early stage 
businesses improved their grant application writing by learning from past failures, or were 
successful because they collaborated with experienced academic grant writers. Some 
exhibited positive path dependency (Teece, 2007), being successful because they had forged 
good links with equity investors, such as an aerospace spin-out, which was able to secure 
grant and matching VC funding (totalling £600,000) within a three month fundraising period. 
However, others who had not managed businesses in the sector, or sought equity finance 
previously, were unsuccessful, being slower to adapt, seek advice and, crucially, to find good 
quality assistance.   
 
This underlines the importance of accessing suitable high quality advice, training and 
collaborators. For example, one academic life science founder highly praised Strathclyde 
University’s one year entrepreneurial training programme which most importantly “provided 
equity investor networking contacts and clear insights into how to raise funding.”  This 
founder was also recommended to appoint an advisory board and experienced chairperson for 
the business. However, as another life science founder explained, hiring suitable people is 
crucial:   
 
“You want people who have got experience of setting up companies. Initially we received bad 
advice, including hiring a very senior, experienced CEO to run the business side of things. 
They have proved expensive and lacked the relevant connections in the industry and drive to 
succeed that we required.” 
 
The crucial point here is that, whilst IRP(s) are important in assisting with business planning, 
financials, presentation and pitching and negotiating potential deals (Mason and Kwok, 2010), 
to be effective it has also to introduce the businesses to suitable sources of finance through 
effective networks and relationships. Recent schemes such as the UK government’s ‘Growth 
Accelerator’12 will only succeed if they create suitable financing network links, particularly 




Growth stage businesses exhibited more developed, larger and more experienced 
management teams, typically including experienced Chief Finance Officers (CFOs), and 
almost half have non-executive directors (NEDs) or advisory chairs or boards. They are also 
more likely to pay for professional advisory services, including VC finders, financial lawyers 
and accountants and City brokers in relation to IPOs. These more formalised arrangements are 
often driven by the strict financial governance requirements that hands-on business angel and 
VC investors require (Baldock, 2015). This increasing level of financial management 
experience at the growth stage is reflected in the high proportion with previous experience 
obtaining suitable grant and equity finance and the higher level of successful applications for 
external finance (Table 5); findings supporting the Burger and Udell (1998) business 
financing cycle model and also the RBV approach (Barney, 1991). Furthermore, these 
managers exhibit clear path dependency characteristics influencing their external financing 
pecking order choices. For example, those with current equity investors would first inquire 
with them about further investment before seeking further similar types of equity which could 
be characterised by preferences for either angel or VC, or for private equity over public 
equity, supporting Baldock’s (2015) findings. However, there was no evidence of the 
potential negative impacts of path dependency where CEOs might be forced by investors to 
take particular financing paths (Hirsch and Waltz, 2011). Moreover, there was awareness that 
although current investors would not desire dilution of their share value, successful 
development of the business was the overriding requirement for both investors and 
management.     
 
Returning to the three longer horizon growth stage businesses, that initially failed to secure 
their required finance, confirms the importance of prior funding experience and the value of 
high quality advice. They required substantial funding (£1m to £12m) which could not be 
supplied by banks and required the managers to seek equity finance for the first time. They all 
employed VC finders, but only one was successful and this took three years. The other two 
businesses revised their business financing models. One uses R&D consultancy revenue to 
match fund successful grant applications, whilst the other switched to a licensing operation 
requiring customers to make the capital plant investment. These examples of business 
pivoting through absorptive learning processes will slow down their progress and potentially 
reduce their growth prospects, but have enabled survival and progression.    
 
Finally, it is notable that collaborative financing, forged by longer-term business and R&D 
relationships with academics has played an important role in financing growth stage 
businesses. Notable examples include a life science businesses that works with world leading 
UK academics in advanced drug discoveries that has “a better than 50% success record in 
grant writing” and an engineering R&D business that has “joint-ventured with a well 
established German manufacturing supplier in developing innovative icepig, pipe-cleaning 
processes.”               
 
 
The influence of finance gaps on pathways      
 
This pathways demand-side analysis reveals the strengths and weaknesses of the interviewed 
businesses. It indicates that many first time founders lack formal and coherent strategies for 
accessing appropriate forms of grant and equity finance and few early stage founders knew 
about crowd-source equity options at the time the research was undertaken. Furthermore, in 
addressing these demand-side deficiencies, the value of suitable high quality training and 
assistance is confirmed. These findings strongly support the need for IRPs, ongoing 
mentoring and affordable finance finding services in order to produce a suitable pipeline of 
investible early stage businesses (Mason and Kwok, 2010; Mason and Brown, 2013).  
 
However, taking these demand-side deficiencies into consideration, it is also apparent (from 
our ‘T-scores’) that there are potential funding gaps in the current UK financing escalator. 
These particularly relate to longer horizon innovative businesses at the early and growth 
stages. First, the study found that a high proportion of successful early stage grant applicant 
businesses (5 out of 17), mainly from Innovate UK, have been unable to find the required 
matching funding (typically 40%) from debt or equity sources and that this is concentrated 
amongst longer horizon innovation businesses (4 out of 9). They face particular difficulties 
obtaining bank or alternative crowd sourcing debt finance (e.g. Funding Circle13), as they do 
not have at least two years’ trading record. They also have considerable difficulties finding 
equity investors and contend that the current SEIS and EIS schemes are not sufficiently large 
or attractive enough for longer horizon investors; “angel investors were all looking for short-
term returns”, whilst private VCs are “like banks, averse to risk and want to see a proven 
track record, by which stage we don’t need their investment.”  In some cases, they have 
sought early stage corporate (e.g. pharma) equity and looked overseas to Europe and the US 
for this, but it is “…rarely available for early stage finance and, where it is, it can be 
restrictive on market development.” (see also Baldock and North, 2015) It was also evident 
that where equity funding was received, it was often insufficient and would lead to a drip-feed 
of further interim funding rounds. The amounts of funding required recorded in this funding 
gap ranged from £50,000 up to £1.6m. 
 
Second, there is evidence suggesting a significant funding gap for longer horizon growth 
stage businesses seeking ‘series A-B’ funding rounds of £1m to £12m, suggesting an 
                                                            
13 Funding Circle’s £250,000 unsecured lending cap is relatively small for some longer horizon projects 
enlargement of the Rowlands’ gap (2009). For these businesses, the size of funding required 
in combination with their patient capital requirements and relatively early trading positions, 
means that bank finance remains difficult to access, even with the EFG, and that they are still 
too early stage for private VC. The UK banks’ establishment of the Business Growth Fund 
(BGF) in 2011 has not sufficiently addressed this requirement as it offers between £1-10m 
finance to businesses that have achieved annual sales turnover of over £5m.      
 
The existence of these two funding gaps can be highly damaging to the affected businesses. 
Delays in finding funding can take several years (Table 5) and this often results in 
management attention spent on fundraising rather than maintaining innovation progress, 
potentially allowing competitors to catch up (Baldock and Mason, 2015). The surveyed 
businesses are survivors, resilient and resourceful. There were some concerns that 
government and EU backed regional VCs were risk averse, “operating like private VCs” or 
simply did not have the scale of funding (individual investments typically being capped at 
£2m, Table 1) to meet the enlarged series A-B gap (Baldock and North, 2015). Alternatively, 
these businesses employ bootstrapping techniques to survive periods of external funding 
shortages (Mac an Bhaird and Lucy, 2015). This involves self-financing using directors’ 
personal finance, working without wages and undertaking contract research for income. This 
study also found evidence of the importance of collaboration to fund innovation, with several 
businesses adopting licensing and joint venturing approaches to overcome their own external 
financing shortages.       
 
Confirmation of changing demand trends 
 
The findings from this study can be compared with the parallel study of North et al., (2013) 
examining the financing of early and growth stage UK TBSFs between 2007-2010, spanning 
immediately prior the GFC through to the height of the GFC recession. Whilst this is not an 
exact match, it contains 53 SMEs from similar sectors, with a similar balance of longer and 
shorter innovation investment horizons that had sought external finance. This reveals clear 
post GFC financing demand changes amongst these TBSFs: demand for bank loan finance 
declined from 47% to 13%; demand for VC finance increased from 23% to 43%; demand for 
HNWI/angel finance increased from 26% to 45%; demand for grant finance increased from 
47% to 63%. Furthermore, whilst North et al., (2013) found some cases of bootstrapping (8 
per cent) and collaborative financing (4 per cent), the evidence from the current study is that 
these activities have increased (25 per cent bootstrapping and 18 per cent undertaking or 
currently considering JV/licensing arrangements).     
   
 
Conclusion and Policy Implications  
 
In conclusion, using a unique analytical framework approach combining finance escalator 
theory with a RBV approach of management experience and advisory networks, this paper 
has addressed four propositions relating to the external financing pathways of young 
innovative UK SMEs. Contemporary post GFC insight is provided into the changing nature of 
entrepreneurial financing demand preferences and evolving UK finance escalator supply for 
early and growth stage development, whilst also demonstrating the key roles of management 
experience, good quality advisory and finance finding services, collaborative financing, 
business absorptive capacity and adaptability. The study is limited by its demand-side focus, 
scale (in terms of quantitative robustness) and broadly cross-sectional approach. However, 
concentrating on viable surviving innovative businesses with national and global growth 
potential, it demonstrates that where adequate external finance is sourced, often with 
government backed finance, high growth can be achieved and innovation finance policy 
appears vindicated.     
 
Proposition 1 revealed key differences between early and growth stage businesses. Early stage 
businesses initially support the PoH, but demonstrate far greater acceptance of equity finance 
for early stage financing than anticipated, due to the retreat of bank debt finance from the UK 
early stage market. External financing at this stage is dominated by grant funding, HNWIs 
and seed VC, but there are problems in finding grant match funding, leading to extensive 
innovation delays for some businesses. There is also evidence of bootstrapping and shifts 
towards collaborative financing approaches. Growth stage businesses have access to a far 
wider range of equity finance, as the finance escalator forecasts, including business angel 
syndicates, VC, PE and IPO, but still find bank debt finance difficult to obtain. However, their 
substantially higher funding requirements also lead to funding shortfalls and the need for 
collaborative financing arrangements through joint ventures and licensing.                        
 
Proposition 2 demonstrated that longer horizon business innovation is far more complex to 
finance than shorter horizon. Their larger scale funding requirements at both early and growth 
stages lead to ‘drip-feed’ equity investment, typically from VCs who have greater funding 
capacity than business angels, multiple funding rounds and in some cases to R&D contract 
income requirements or collaborative joint venture or licensing arrangements to share 
innovation costs. This problem is most acute for growth stage businesses, demonstrating an 
enlargement of the Rowlands’ gap beyond £10m.  
 
Proposition 3 supports the RBV hypothesis in overcoming asymmetric information barriers to 
external finance. There is clear evidence of superior success rates of growth stage over early 
stage businesses, with their larger, more experienced and better networked management teams 
and more formalised approaches in obtaining external finance. They typically benefit from 
existing investors who drive formalisation, can offer additional finance, or facilitate pathways 
to other investors; evidencing positive path dependency. For earlier stage businesses, quality 
of advice and ongoing specialist support was most influential in finding and successfully 
applying for finance, whilst for businesses at both stages good quality collaborative 
relationships for grant writing are important. There is also evidence of absorptive capacity 
benefits, with early and growth stage managers learning from their mistakes by improving 
their funding applications and business financing models.    
 
Proposition 4 presents two apparent gaps in the current UK financing escalator, which 
together with the need for better visibility of public and private VC and improved specialist 
advice and support, provide clear insight into where government policy could make a 
difference. First, early stage longer horizon innovation is struggling to find equity finance to 
match grant funds. Second, longer horizon growth stage businesses are struggling to find the 
scale of equity finance required.  
 
To address these gaps there is a need for more coherent grant funding with better linkages to 
matching debt or equity schemes, through IRP and finance finding services, and which takes a 
whole of innovation life view (Hughes, 2009; Mason and Brown, 2013), with provision for 
follow-on funding and matching to avoid the current disjointed ‘funding for failure’ approach. 
With regard to improving equity finance provision, there is a perceived requirement for higher 
caps on SEIS and EIS and greater incentives for longer horizon investment, whilst the 
potential introduction of larger-scale government Enterprise Capital Funds under the 
increased £5m EU state aid cap could address the ‘series A-B’ requirements.  
 
Addressing these persistent finance gaps clearly requires further research to examine efficient 
supply-side operation and changing demand-side preferences and requirements, as the post 
GFC UK finance escalator evolves. There are lessons here which extend beyond the UK, 
particularly in terms of the implications for a more enhanced oversight agency role, such as a 
state investment bank (Mazzucato and Penna, 2014). This would require a broader more 
direct interventionist role than is currently operated by the British Business Bank in the UK. 
Furthermore, with the increasing importance of collaborative funding, which crosses 
international borders, more could be done to catalyse this, with for example Innovate UK 
sector specialisation (e.g. developing the Bio-medical Catalyst model), bringing together 
academics/researchers, SME innovators and industry buyers and suppliers, extending 
internationally.   
Further qualitative and quantitative research is warranted on niche sector innovative small 
businesses, to delve deeper into process issues, the resource base of human and social capital 
and to confirm successful strategies for securing external finance. Family-owned business 
may also be a special case that deserves further research. 
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Type of finance Funding Description Administering Body 
Tax   
R&D Tax Credits SME scheme (<500 employees & £100m sales) for corporate tax rebate or cashback HMRC 
Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme Start-up (<25 employees) investor tax relief, up to 50%: investor cap £100k, firm cap £150k pa HMRC 
Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS) Early stage (<500 employees) tax relief, up to 30%: investor cap £1m, firm cap £5m pa  HMRC 
Venture Capital Trusts (VCTs) VCs funded through EIS investing in SMEs (<£15m assets) BBB 
Grants   
Innovate UK (UKRI) 
 
Various match fund grants: Knowledge Transfer Partnerships (<£80k), SMART awards 
(<£250k), Launchpad and Feasibility (<£400k), Collaboration and Catapult (£10m+)  Innovate UK 
European grants Horizon2020 and Eurostars grants (up to E300k at 50% match-funding)  EU 
Regional Growth Fund (RGF) Loans and grants through the £2.6bn RGF for English Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) BIS 
Debt/loans   
Enterprise Finance Guarantee (EFG) 75% government guarantee on loans, overdrafts and invoice finance capped at £1m HMRC 
Business Finance Partnership (BFP) 
 
£100m govt co-invest into invoice, supply chain, asset, mezzanine (growth loans) and P2P 
(e.g. Funding Circle, Zopa) BBB 
VC/equity   
Angel Co-investment Fund (ACF) £100m evergreen angel co-invest fund, from 2011 BBB 
Enterprise Capital Funds (ECF) £840m co-invest VC funds, from 2006 (£400m boost, 2015) BBB 
UK Innovation Investment Fund (UKIIF) £250m govt/EIF fund of funds for health, manufacture, green sectors, from 2009 BBB 
Regional Venture Capital Funds 
(RVCFs) 
North West (£190m), Yorkshire & Humber (£90m+), North East (£125m), East of England 
(£20.5m Low Carbon Innovation Fund) - range of loans and equity (£2m cap) 
EU JEREMIE/ERDF, 
BBB 
Devolved UK Governments 
 




Universities Innovation Fund 
 
£160m (Higher Education Innovation Fund) and University Enterprise Zone Pilots (£15m), 
Knowledge Transfer Networks HEFCE 
Energy Entrepreneurs Fund (EEF) £150m EEF and £10m Energy Innovation Fund DECC 
Export finance   
UK Export Finance £1.5b scheme 2012-15 to assist export trade credit arrangements UK Export Finance 
Note 1 (acronyms): BBB - British Business Bank; BIS – Dept for Business Innovation and Skills; HMRC - Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs; DECC – Dept for Energy and Climate Change; DETI – 
Northern Ireland Dept for Enterprise Trade and Industry; ERDF – European Regional Development Funds; FW – Finance Wales; JEREMIE - Joint European Resources for Micro to medium Enterprises SIB 
– Scottish Investment Bank 
Note 2 (research period): table details available finance during research period, please note BBB introduction of English Regional Funds in the North (Northern Powerhouse £400m), Midlands (Midlands 
Engine £250m), and West (Cornwall and Isles of Scilly £40m) from 2017-18 which may replace EU regional funds, depending on UK exit negotiations with the EU.  
Sources: Adapted from Baldock and North (2015); BIS (2012a); British Business Bank (2015) 
Table 2: Contemporary UK Finance Escalator and Financial Information Resource Base Framework 
Source: Adapted from Nesta (2009a), Baldock and Mason (2015) and BIS (2015) 







































































































All with no 
delay 
Lower Quartile (n=10) 11.4 to 20.2 16.7 50%* 40%* 40% 
Upper Quartile (n=10) 30.7 to 37.3 32.6 80% 80% 80%* 
Total Sample (n=40) 11.4 to 37.3 25.2 72% 63% 57% 
Early Stage (n=24) 11.4 to 33.3 23.9 63% 46% 42% 


















































































  Stage  Innovation Horizon  Stage  Innovation Horizon 
  Early stage 
(n=24) 
Longer  
(n=13) 
Shorter  
(n=11) 
Growth 
(n=16) 
Longer  
(n=10) 
Shorter 
(n=6) 
Main Reasons: 
R&D 
Working Capital 
Concept (PoC) 
Prototyping/test 
Staff/recruit 
Marketing 
 
13 
6 
4 
4 
4 
5 
 
7 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
 
6 
3 
2 
2 
2 
3 
 
6 
1 
2 
6 
3 
5 
 
4 
1 
1 
5 
1 
4 
 
2 
0 
1 
1 
2 
1 
Types Finance: 
Grants 
Bank 
HNWI/Angels 
VC 
Accelerator 
PE/Corp 
Joint Venture 
IPO 
 
17 
3 
12 
7 
1 
1 
0 
0 
 
9 
1 
6 
6 
0 
1 
0 
0 
 
8 
2 
6 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
 
8 
2 
5 
10 
0 
2 
2 
2 
 
4 
2 
3 
6 
0 
2 
1 
1 
 
4 
0 
2 
4 
0 
0 
1 
1 
Amount (£): 
Range 
Median 
 
£25k to £3m 
£200k 
 
£40k‐£2.5m 
£200k 
 
£25k to £3m 
£150k 
 
£40k‐£12m 
£1m 
 
£120k‐£12m 
£1.6m 
 
£40k‐£7m 
£215k 
Initial  Outcome*: 
All 
Some 
None 
 
9 
10 (cond**) 
4 
 
3 
7 
2 
 
6 
3 
2 
 
13 
1 
2 
 
7 
1 
2 
 
6 
0 
0 
Time to Outcome: 
Range 
Median 
 
<1m to 3+ yrs 
3 months 
 
<1m to 3+ yrs 
3 months 
 
<1m to 1yr 
3 months 
 
<1m‐2yrs 
3 months 
 
2mths‐2yrs 
9 months 
 
<1m‐6+mths 
2 months 
If some/None: 
Scale‐down 
Slow down 
Resume search 
 
4 
14  
10 med 2 yrs 
 
1 
9 
8 med 2+yrs 
 
3 
5 
2 med 2yrs 
 
1 
3 
3 med 3 yrs 
 
2 
3 
3 med 3 yrs 
 
0 
0 
0 
Final Outcome*: 
All 
Some 
None 
 
11 
4 
8 
 
3 
2 
7 
 
8 
2 
1 
 
14 
0 
2 
 
8 
0 
2 
 
6 
0 
0 
Note:   * One early stage business had not received a grant application result 
** Includes mostly grant cases (from Innovate UK) conditional upon match funding  
Table 6:  Management Experience and Resources Hierarchy by Stage  
 
Management Experience Characteristics 
Early stage (n=24): 
First time founder 
 
 
Corp spin‐out manager 
 
Serial Entrepreneur 
 
Training/advice user 
 
 
Small Management Team 
(i.e. more than founder 
innovators)  
 
Funding experience 
 
Collaborative Funding 
University spin‐out, independent innovator/first time in business 
owner‐management (12) 
 
Experienced managing in sector, but not an owner‐manager (3) 
 
Previous management experience in sector, investor director (9) 
 
IRP, entrepreneurial training, mentoring, incubator/accelerator,  
LEP/Gateway advice (17) 
 
Founder and other director/investors, may have NED or oversight 
advisory board (8)   
 
 
Experience of applying for suitable grant or equity stage funds (13) 
 
Working with academics, or licensing (6) 
Growth stage (n=15*): 
Management Team 
 
External Management 
 
Advice user 
 
Funding experience 
 
Collaborative Funding 
Clearly defined management team with CFO and board (11) 
 
NEDs, advisory chairs/boards, investor input/reporting (7) 
 
VC/PE fundraisers, IPO brokers, finance lawyers (8) 
 
Experience of applying for suitable grant or equity stage funds (12) 
 
Working with academic, licensing or joint ventures (5) 
Note: figures in parenthesis represent businesses; *one growth stage case with insufficient valid data 
 
